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Abstract 
 
Does corruption ease the burden of regulation? We test this question using survey data on 
business managers’ experience of dealing with regulation and corruption. We find that there is 
substantial within-country variation in the burden of regulation and that corruption is associated 
with worse regulatory outcomes across a range of indicators at the country and subnational 
level. Our results, which hold over a number of specifications, are inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that corruption greases the wheels of commerce by easing the burden of regulation 
on the average firm in poor regulatory environments. Rather, our results suggest that corruption 
increases the burden and imposes large costs on businesses. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Does corruption ease the burden of regulation by helping businesses to spend less time and 
resources dealing with red tape? Alternatively, do corrupt officials use red tape as a tool to 
extract larger bribes, forcing businesses to waste time and resources? Many studies conclude 
that corruption is associated with misgovernance and low-quality regulation (Banerjee, 1997; 
Djankov 2002; Guriev 2004; Breen and Gillanders 2012). However, a recent study finds that 
the burden of formal regulation does not correlate with managers’ experience of dealing with 
regulation (Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett, 2015: 123). Following this line of argument, we 
revisit the link between corruption and regulation using data on de jure regulation from the 
World Bank’s Doing Business project and on de facto regulation from the World Bank’s 
Enterprise Surveys, a series of global surveys that contain data on managers’ experience of 
doing business. The surveys record the amount of time that firms spend dealing with overall 
regulation, as well as the extent to which they perceive that regulation is a major constraint on 
their operations. 
We find that more corruption is associated with a greater regulatory burden on average, across 
a range of indicators at both the national and subnational level. The indicators include the time 
spent dealing with regulation, and the extent to which a) licenses and permits, b) tax 
administration, and c) customs and trade regulations are major constraints to doing business. 
As well as contributing to the literature on the determinants of regulation, these findings also 
have implications for a related literature on the growth effects of corruption. This literature 
argues that corruption may increase growth in environments where firms must contend with 
low-quality regulation and institutions.1 Our results are inconsistent with this argument, in that 
they suggest that the average firm is impeded and constrained by corruption. However, this 
does not rule out the possibility that corruption facilitates growth by enabling the most efficient 
firms to avoid regulation. Finally, we find that the association between corruption and increased 
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regulatory burden continues to hold in countries and subnational units characterized by low-
quality regulations and institutions. 
This article is organized as follows. First, we review the empirical literature on the determinants 
of regulation and then we consider the role of corruption as an efficient ‘grease’. We then 
proceed to outline our data, method, and results. The results are presented in three parts: the 
first presents our findings regarding the overall association between corruption and regulation 
and the second and third parts describe the findings from our subnational analysis and sub-
sample tests. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for 
research and policy. 
 
2. LITERATURE 
The quality of regulation is shaped by corruption, institutions, and a range of historical and 
geographic factors. However, previous empirical studies on the links between corruption and 
regulation have not differentiated between de facto and de jure regulation. The difference is 
important, as it may appear that stringent formal regulations are associated with more 
corruption when in practice firms may sidestep the costs of de jure regulation entirely. 
Furthermore, there is growing evidence that the burden of corruption and regulation differ 
considerably within countries. Some regions in a country may experience dramatically 
different levels of both, suggesting that we should look within, as well as across countries in 
order to understand the impact of corruption on regulation. We now describe the literature and 
present arguments on how to advance it to address these issues. 
(a) The determinants of regulation 
Regulation has the potential to help societies by reducing or eliminating market failures. 
However, some parts of society benefit more from shaping regulation than others. Special 
interest groups, in particular, may use their resources to capture the government agencies that 
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design and monitor compliance with regulations. Indeed, the public choice approach contends 
that regulation is often acquired by industries and designed for their benefit (Stigler, 1971). 
This outcome is known as regulatory capture, and it can happen through legal practices like 
lobbying and political donations or illegal practices like corruption (Laffont and Tirole, 1991). 
In line with the public choice approach, many studies find that corruption affects the quality of 
regulation. Guriev (2004), for example, presents a theoretical model in which he finds that 
some kinds of corruption can reduce red tape, but the equilibrium level of red tape is always 
above the social optimum. Breen and Gillanders (2012) find that corruption is associated with 
worse business regulation in a sample of 100 countries from 2000 to 2009. However, that study 
and the majority of empirical studies on the determinants of regulation consider only de jure 
or formal regulation.2 Even if corruption is responsible for a more complex and seemingly 
burdensome legal and regulatory environment, as Breen and Gillanders (2012) argue, does it 
necessarily follow that corruption imposes real burdens on firms? According to Hallward-
Driemeier and Pritchett (2015: 123), there is little correlation between de jure and de facto 
measures of regulation: the stringency of formal regulation on the books is not correlated with 
managers’ actual experience of dealing with regulation. There are two ways, in particular, that 
corruption may help firms to sidestep regulation. First, it may increase the legal requirements 
on firms, as corrupt officials use these requirements to extract bribes. Second, corrupt officials 
may be willing and able, for a fee or other benefit, to waive large swathes of legal requirements 
(Djankov et al., 2002).  The empirical question as to which of these mechanisms dominates is 
the focus of this article.  
Furthermore, the majority of empirical studies on the causes and consequences of regulation 
use the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators to measure the quality of regulation. These 
indicators come from surveys which ask experts to comment on a small domestically owned 
manufacturing company, usually in a country’s commercial capital. This focus may bias the 
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data towards the regulatory experience of firms in the center, which may differ considerably 
from the experience of firms across a country’s regions, as administrative and state capacity to 
enforce compliance with regulation may differ significantly within countries. Monitoring in 
provinces may not be as stringent and there may be important differences in infrastructure, and 
population density, as well as other cultural and historical factors. Indeed, previous research 
finds that corruption can vary within an economy. For example, Cole et al. (2009) find that it 
varies in the case of China, Ledyaeva et al. (2013) in Russia, and Gillanders (2014) across a 
sample of economies.  
Of course, many factors besides corruption also contribute to the quality of regulation including 
institutional quality, geographic factors, and different legal traditions. Good institutions may 
produce better regulations and foster more accountability among the government agencies that 
design and enforce regulations. Furthermore, higher quality institutions may help societies to 
resist processes like regulatory capture and make it more difficult for special interest groups to 
lobby for regulation (or deregulation) that benefits only a narrow segment of society. In line 
with these arguments, Djankov et al. (2002) find that countries with larger, less democratic, 
and more interventionist governments regulate business entry more heavily. La Porta et al. 
(1997) find there is a strong association between different legal tradition and a broad range of 
regulatory outcomes, including the protection of investors. Similarly, Botero et al. (2004), find 
a strong association between legal tradition and the regulation of labor markets. In summary, 
the literature on the quality of regulation points to corruption, institutions, and historical factors 
as key predictors. However, a related literature on the growth-effects of corruption argues that 
there are particular circumstances in which corruption might be beneficial, which we now 
consider. 
(b) The conditional case for corruption? 
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One of the most controversial debates in economics centers on whether corruption ‘greases’ or 
‘sands’ the wheels of commerce. The debate centers on the effect of corruption in poor 
regulatory environments. If bribery works in these places, it may help businesses to reduce the 
cost of compliance with bad regulations, or speed things up when dealing with slow public 
officials, thus raising growth and productivity. On the other hand, corrupt officials may find it 
easier to use regulation as a tool to extract larger bribes where institutional quality is low, 
making it less likely that corruption will feed into higher growth. In this article, we do not focus 
on the growth-effects of corruption but we note that regulation is a central feature of this 
argument, as it is the primary channel through which the ‘grease’ of bribes affects growth and 
productivity.  
While the literature advances the argument that corruption may increase growth under 
constraints, it is aware also of the potential costs of corruption. Bribery is an illegal and 
inherently risky activity. In most countries, severe cases are punished by imprisonment and in 
some countries, public officials have been executed for corruption. Moreover, the average firm 
may not realize any advantage from bribery if it is a tool used by corrupt public officials to 
harass firms according to their ability to pay bribes. Indeed, individual firms may benefit from 
paying a bribe to skip the queue but on average corruption may stifle firm activity through 
more burdensome regulation, as corrupt officials extract larger bribes from the most profitable 
businesses. Not to mention the possibility that an inefficient firm may pay the largest bribe by 
compromising on quality to do so (Rose-Ackerman, 1997). Finally, we should not assume that 
firms always direct bribes at regulations that strangle economic development when they may 
sometimes use bribery to circumvent or eliminate good regulations (Bertrand et al., 2007). 
There are many studies that test the impact of corruption on the economy. For example, Mauro 
(1995) finds that corruption is associated with lower growth in two datasets covering between 
68 and 57 countries from 1971 to 1983. Méon and Sekkat (2005) find that corruption reduces 
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growth in a sample of 63 to 71 countries from 1970 to 1998 and that growth is even worse as 
governance deteriorates. However, Méon and Weill (2010) argue that testing overall impact of 
corruption on growth is not a direct test of the grease hypothesis; nor is an overall negative 
effect inconsistent with the idea that corruption may grease the wheels. Rather, they argue that 
researchers should focus on whether corruption helps countries with weak institutions to take 
advantage of their factor endowments. They study 69 countries from 2000 to 2003 using the 
World Bank’s Control of Corruption (CC) and Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI). In some estimations, they find a statistically significant positive 
marginal effect of an increase in corruption on efficiency in poorly governed countries, and in 
others, the effect becomes insignificant in these countries (Méon and Weill, 2010:253). 
Following this study, Dreher and Gassebner (2013) find that corruption is associated with a 
higher rate of firm entry in the presence of administrative barriers to entry in a sample of 43 
countries from 2003 to 2005, using the CC and CPI to measure corruption and the World 
Bank’s Doing Business indicators to measure regulation.3  
Both Méon and Weill’s (2010) and Dreher and Gassebner’s (2013) works are sophisticated in 
their approach to testing the grease hypothesis. However, like many studies in the literature, 
they rely on macro indicators of corruption perceptions. Aidt (2009:271), who finds against the 
hypothesis, argues ‘that all the claims made about the corruption-growth nexus based on 
statistical analysis of the perception-based indices of corruption disappear when a cross-
national index of managers’ actual experience with corruption is used to approximate 
corruption.’ Indeed, Kaufmann and Wei, (1999) find that firms which pay more bribes spend 
more time dealing with regulation and suffer a higher cost of capital, in a study that uses data 
from three worldwide firm-level surveys from 1995 to 1997. Fisman and Svensson (2007) find 
that the bribery rate is associated with a reduction in firm growth of three percent in a survey 
of Ugandan firms from 1995-97.4 
8 
 
(c) Lessons 
The literature on the determinants of regulation and the related literature on the growth effects 
of corruption contain useful lessons for our study. The first is that we must distinguish clearly 
between regulation in principle and in practice if we are to understand whether corruption eases 
the burden of regulation. Ideally, empirical tests should incorporate measures of both de facto 
and de jure regulation, to understand how regulation is experienced by firms as well as its 
formal quality or lack thereof. The second is that there are reasons to expect that corruption 
and regulatory quality can vary within an economy. Finally, we must consider both the general 
association between corruption and regulation and the possibility that the impact of corruption 
on regulation is contingent on the existing institutional and regulatory context. Recent 
contributions on the contingent effect of corruption on the economy agree that it may have an 
overall negative effect while having a positive effect under some conditions, and it is possible 
that the same is true of the association between corruption and regulation.  
 
3. DATA AND METHOD 
Our primary variables of interest come from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys. These are 
representative firm-level surveys on a wide range of topics relevant to the business 
environment. From these surveys, we gathered two datasets, one consisting of country-level 
indicators and the other consisting of subnational indicators. The data is a highly unbalanced 
panel with some countries surveyed once and others surveyed multiple times. 
We use four outcome variables that come from survey questions about the extent to which 
regulatory issues affect firm operations. Three of our four outcome variables come from 
questions about the extent to which a) tax administration, b) business licensing and permits, 
and c) customs and trade relations are constraints to the respondent’s firm’s operations. Our 
fourth outcome variable captures firms’ responses to the following question: 
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In a typical week over the last 12 months, what percentage of total senior 
management's time was spent in dealing with requirements imposed by 
government regulations?5 
Each of our regulatory constraint variables captures firm-level perceptions of the extent to 
which regulation is problematic because it is costly and (or) time-consuming.6 While not 
objective, they are at least based on the firm’s own experiences as opposed to the perceptions 
of others. Furthermore, our variable which focuses specifically on the percentage of senior 
management time spent dealing with overall regulation provides a different view of the 
regulatory burden, as one can imagine situations where firms might consider something to be 
time-consuming but not necessarily burdensome and vice versa. At both levels of aggregation, 
when examining a constraint variable we are interested in the percentage of firms in each 
country or subnational unit that report that the factor in question is a major or very severe 
obstacle to their operations. Similarly, when examining the time spent dealing with regulations 
we are interested in the average number of hours reported. 
 Our subnational units do not necessarily correspond to real administrative or geographical 
regions. For example, Kazakhstan is divided into center, north, south, east, and west, whereas 
the areas surveyed in Kenya are Kisumu, Mombasa, Nairobi, and Nakuru. We obtained our 
macro-level averages of these variables from the Enterprise Surveys’ website and for our 
subnational analysis, we generated averages of the firm-level data for each survey-unit. We 
dropped countries with only one region and regions with only one firm.  
Our main explanatory variable is corruption. Following Gillanders (2014), we measure 
corruption from an Enterprise Survey question that asks whether corruption is No Obstacle, a 
Minor Obstacle, a Major Obstacle, or a Very Severe Obstacle to the current operations of the 
establishment. Like our outcome variables, this is not entirely objective because it contains a 
subjective appraisal but unlike common indices of corruption it is based on firms own 
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experiences of corruption. While we acknowledge the potential shortcomings of this measure, 
it has two desirable features. First, the commonly used metrics from Transparency International 
(CPI) and the World Bank (CC) are largely based on appraisals by so-called experts and 
therefore have been criticised on these grounds by many authors as being subject to perception 
biases (Svensson, 2003; Reinikka and Svensson, 2006; Fan, Lin and Treisman, 2009) and a 
tendency to lag reality (Knack, 2007; Kenny, 2009). Second, and crucially for our purposes, 
this firm-level information allows us to generate subnational indicators. Gillanders (2014) 
demonstrates that there is meaningful subnational variation in corruption according to this 
measure. 
We control for the Rule of Law from the World Governance Indicators (WGI), as a proxy for 
institutional quality, and GDP per capita and land area in square kilometers from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI). Our subnational-level control variables are generated from the 
Enterprise Survey. Table A1 presents summary statistics for all of the variables used in this 
article. 
Endogeneity is an obvious concern at both levels, and while we can include country fixed 
effects to account for omitted variables and unobserved heterogeneity, a simple and obvious 
reverse causality story, whereby poor regulation and regulatory practice incentivizes 
corruption, means that we must refrain from making any causal claims. Instrumental variable 
strategies have been implemented in cross-country settings to address this concern. For 
example, Breen and Gillanders (2012) use distance to the equator, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, and the age of the state as instruments for corruption. In our context, these 
instruments fail to pass the standard diagnostic and are suspect on an intuitive level. 
Furthermore, no comparable, or sensible, instruments can be generated from the Enterprise 
Surveys for use in the subnational case. Controlling for de jure regulation as we do in Table 4 
below addresses this concern somewhat as it allows us to control for the formal burden of red 
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tape, and therefore some of the incentive to pay bribes related to regulation. Therefore, we 
proceed to present simple, yet carefully considered, OLS estimates of the relationship of 
interest and speak only of associations.  
 
4. RESULTS 
 
(a) Country-level results 
Figure 1 illustrates a strong association between the extent to which corruption is viewed by 
firms within a country to be a problem and our four measures of regulatory burden. The first 
panel shows that the time spent by senior managers dealing with regulation increases as the 
percentage of firms identifying corruption as a major constraint increases. A similar 
relationship is evident in panels 2 to 4, which focus on how much of a problem tax, business 
licensing and permits, and trade are for firms. We now proceed to test their robustness to the 
inclusion of covariates. 
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Figure 1. Corruption and Regulatory Burden at the Country-Level 
 
 
Note: Time is time spent dealing with overall regulation, Tax is the percentage of firms that report tax as a major 
constraint, Permits is the percentage of firms that report business licensing and permits as a major constraint, 
Trade is the percentage of firms that report customs and trade regulations as a major constraint. 
 
Table 1 presents estimates of the relationship between corruption and our four regulatory 
constraint variables, controlling for several potentially important variables. First, we control 
for general institutional quality using the World Bank’s Rule of Law indicator. In places where 
the overall ‘rules of the game’ are better, this may translate also into a better business 
environment that imposes fewer unnecessary constraints on firms. Second, we control for GDP 
per capita to allow for the possibility that richer countries have greater state capacity and thus 
more effective regulatory systems. Finally, we control for the geographic size of a country 
because larger countries may be harder to administer and slower to reform.  
We find that corruption is a significant predictor of the burden of regulation across our four 
outcomes: more corrupt countries tend to have more burdensome regulation, at least from the 
point of view of their firms. Furthermore, institutional quality, as measured by the Rule of Law, 
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is statistically insignificant, with the exception of the model in column 2 where tax 
administration is the outcome variable. These results are largely in line with the findings of 
Kaufman and Wei (1999) and Breen and Gillanders (2012). Interestingly, the senior managers 
of firms in richer countries report that they spend more of their time dealing with regulation 
but at the same time view some aspects of regulation as less burdensome. This reinforces the 
need to examine multiple aspects of the regulatory environment. Finally, the results pertaining 
to country size are mixed: our time and permits indicators are negatively affected by country 
size whereas country size is associated with firms reporting less burdensome trade and customs 
regulations.  
 
Table 1. Country-Level Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Time Tax Permits Trade 
     
Corruption 0.14*** 0.40*** 0.22*** 0.29*** 
 (0.023) (0.055) (0.033) (0.040) 
Rule of Law -1.21 3.73** -0.81 -0.03 
 (1.005) (1.774) (1.125) (1.078) 
GDP per capita (log) 1.24** -2.18** 0.61 -1.79*** 
 (0.567) (0.873) (0.553) (0.625) 
Area (log) 0.49*** 0.80 0.93*** -0.92** 
 (0.172) (0.502) (0.269) (0.385) 
     
Observations 215 216 216 215 
R-squared 0.264 0.294 0.324 0.339 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The measures from our survey data capture, at least to some extent, the propensity of 
respondents to complain, whether about corruption or regulation. Therefore, as a robustness 
check columns 1-4 of Table 2 substitute the World Bank’s Control of Corruption variable for 
the World Bank Enterprise Survey measure. The Control of Corruption differs considerably 
from the Enterprise Survey measure of corruption, as it is based on multiple data sources, 
including expert opinion. We drop the Rule of Law from these specifications as it is highly 
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correlated with the Control of Corruption variable (0.91). For the most part, these specifications 
are in line with our previous findings, with the exception of the burden of taxation which is no 
longer statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  
We also address this criticism by adding country dummies in columns 5-8. These dummies are 
added to our original specification in order to control for cultural and other unobserved 
characteristics that may drive the propensity to report problems. The findings from these 
models are broadly in line with those reported in Table 1; the magnitude of the coefficients are 
similar but corruption is no longer a statistically significant predictor of the time managers 
spend dealing with regulation.  
Table 2. Country Level Results: Robustness Checks 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Time Tax Permits Trade Time Tax Permits Trade 
         
Control of Corruption -1.98** -3.52* -3.65*** -3.10**     
 (0.981) (1.874) (1.198) (1.338)     
Corruption     0.12 0.40*** 0.23*** 0.37*** 
     (0.074) (0.121) (0.057) (0.076) 
Rule of Law     0.60 -3.90 2.05 -2.43 
     (4.852) (8.902) (3.771) (5.537) 
GDP per capita (log 1.14* -0.52 1.05* -1.41* 7.86 -20.35** 3.77 -9.87** 
 (0.612) (1.133) (0.612) (0.823) (5.238) (8.260) (4.799) (4.903) 
Area (log) 0.64*** 0.82 1.04*** -0.73* -68.19 1,011.88 139.50 -238.89 
 (0.217) (0.586) (0.323) (0.417) (502.443) (963.189) (538.166) (479.569) 
         
Country FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 215 217 217 216 215 216 216 215 
R-squared 0.082 0.069 0.131 0.101 0.735 0.864 0.885 0.923 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
(b) Subnational-Level Results 
Having established that corruption is associated with more burdensome regulations at the 
country level, we proceed to test this relationship using subnational data. Figure 2 illustrates 
that there is substantial within-country variation to be explained in each of our four indicators. 
In this figure, the top of each bar represents the maximum observed subnational value within a 
country, the bottom the minimum, and the point is the average. We also observe that the within-
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country variation does not have any obvious relationship to the average within a country, as 
the height of the bars does not increase as we move along the x-axis. 
 
Figure 2. Within-in Country Variation in Regulatory Burden 
 
 
 
Note: Time is time spent dealing with overall regulation, Tax is the percentage of firms that report tax as a major 
constraint, Permits is the percentage of firms that report business licensing and permits as a major constraint, 
Trade is the percentage of firms that report customs and trade regulations as a major constraint. 
 
Table 3 presents our subnational results. We control for many of the same factors as the country 
level analysis. The first control variable – Courts – is our proxy for the quality of institutions, 
and captures the fraction of firms in a sub-national unit which report that the courts are a major 
or very severe obstacle to their operations. The second control variable is the average total cost 
of labor, which we use as a proxy for regional GDP since there is no direct measure in our 
dataset. The Enterprise Survey does not contain any geographic information that would allow 
us to control for area. When we control for these factors, columns 1, 4, 7, and 10 show us that 
there is a strong association between corruption and the burden of regulation at the subnational 
level. More corrupt subnational units tend to have more burdensome regulations in the eyes of 
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their firms. These findings lend support to Breen and Gillanders (2012). However, unlike Breen 
and Gillanders (2012) we do find a role for institutional quality, which is statistically significant 
in most of our specifications, except for the time spent dealing with regulation. Moreover, the 
magnitude of the institutional coefficient is larger than the corruption coefficient in most cases, 
suggesting that institutional quality also plays an important role in the quality of the business 
environment.  
Columns 2, 5, 8, and 11 introduce country fixed effects to the specification as it is likely that 
country-level factors play a role in shaping both regulatory outcomes and corruption. Allowing 
for this cross-country heterogeneity, corruption is still associated with regulatory burden in 
most of our specifications, except senior management time spent dealing with regulation. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the relationship is robust to the inclusion of country dummies, 
and the relationship between institutional quality and regulatory burden also holds.  
To account for differences in industrial structures and other features which may influence 
firms’ priorities, columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 include dummy variables to capture global region. We 
find that relative to sub-Saharan Africa, most regions find regulation to be less burdensome, 
although, in Europe, Central Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, senior managers 
spend more time dealing with regulation. While corruption is only significant at the 10 percent 
level in column 3, for the most part, our conclusions regarding corruption hold. 
Taken together, our findings point to a consistent association between corruption and the 
burden of regulation at the subnational level, even when controlling for global region and 
macroeconomic characteristics. Our findings are in line with the results from the country level 
data and suggest that corruption generates a real burden for firms. We also see a role for broader 
institutional quality at this level: subnational units in which the courts are more of a constraint 
are places where the environment is less conducive to business. 
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The story is somewhat different when it comes to the time that senior managers spend dealing 
with regulation. Here, we find no meaningful association when we control for country fixed 
effects and global regions. In columns 2 and 3, corruption is not associated with the amount of 
time it takes to deal with overall regulation. Therefore, in subnational units where corruption 
is worse, different dimensions of regulation are a greater constraint on business but firms do 
not necessarily spend more time dealing with regulation. The burden of corruption on firms is 
still greater in these subnational units, but the cost of dealing with overall regulation is not 
necessarily time-consuming.  
(c) Corruption under low-quality regulation and low-quality institutions 
We now consider the conditional case for corruption; that is, the possibility that it can help in 
regimes that consist of low-quality regulation and weak rule of law. First, we present findings 
that control for de jure regulation using the World Bank’s Doing Business rank and the sub-
rankings from Doing Business that correspond to the specific measures of regulatory constraint 
that we collected from the Enterprise Surveys. In Table 4, columns 1-8 add the Doing Business 
rank as a control variable. Estimates for each of our four regulatory constraint variables are 
presented with and without country dummies. Columns 9-14 add the Doing Business sub-
rankings pertaining to tax, permits, and trade as additional control variables. Estimates in these 
columns are also presented with and without country dummies.  
Our findings regarding the association between corruption and the burden of regulation are 
robust to the inclusion of these variables and the size of the corruption coefficients is largely 
unchanged. However, the ‘way things ought to be done’ as measured by Doing Business, is 
associated with the real burden of regulation in several specifications. In particular, models 
which center on the regulatory constraints regarding tax, permits, customs and trade regulations 
exhibit some response to de jure regulation both in relation to the overall Doing Business rank 
and the more focused sub-rankings. Stricter regulations ‘on the books’ matters for the real 
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burden of regulation in some instances, but this does not undermine our earlier findings 
regarding corruption and the magnitude of the association is not very large. Furthermore, the 
Doing Business rank is arguably a reasonable proxy for the incentive to pay a bribe to avoid 
formal regulatory requirements. Therefore, its inclusion helps to address some of our concerns 
regarding reverse causality. 
Table 5 presents our findings from sub-samples defined by Doing Business and Rule of Law 
performance. The sub-samples relate to subnational units that are in countries that score in the 
bottom 50th and 25th percentiles of the Doing Business rank and Rule of Law rank. In these sub-
samples, the association between the overall time spent dealing with regulation and corruption 
is statistically insignificant. The statistical association between our other regulatory constraint 
variables and the level of corruption is consistent, for the most part, with the findings presented 
in Table 4. In fact, the magnitude of the association between corruption and regulatory 
constraint is greater in most cases across tax, permits, and trade. While it is still possible that 
corruption facilitates growth by enabling the most efficient firms to avoid regulation, overall, 
our findings do not support the hypothesis that corruption greases the wheels for the average 
firm under regimes that display poor regulation or weak institutions.7 
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Table 3. Subnational Level Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Time Time Time Tax Tax Tax Permits Permits Permits Trade Trade Trade 
             
Corruption 0.07*** 0.03 0.05* 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.19*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
 (0.023) (0.033) (0.026) (0.050) (0.061) (0.052) (0.036) (0.047) (0.038) (0.039) (0.047) (0.038) 
Courts 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.45*** 0.20** 0.48*** 0.29*** 0.22*** 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.28*** 0.34*** 
 (0.037) (0.050) (0.041) (0.090) (0.084) (0.088) (0.067) (0.058) (0.065) (0.068) (0.067) (0.065) 
Cost of Labour (log) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.02** 0.01 0.00 0.01** 0.01 -0.01 0.02*** 0.01* 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Europe and Central Asia   0.02*   -0.09***   -0.05***   -0.10*** 
   (0.012)   (0.020)   (0.016)   (0.016) 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
  0.04***   -0.06**   -0.05***   -0.12*** 
   (0.015)   (0.024)   (0.016)   (0.017) 
Rest of the World   -0.01   -0.10***   -0.08***   -0.09*** 
   (0.012)   (0.021)   (0.017)   (0.019) 
             
Country dummies No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
Observations 423 423 423 423 423 423 423 423 423 423 423 423 
R-squared 0.193 0.602 0.230 0.323 0.770 0.365 0.289 0.716 0.326 0.313 0.686 0.413 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Subnational Level Results and Doing Business Rank 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 Time Time Tax Tax Permits Permits Trade Trade Tax Tax Permits Permits Trade Trade 
               
Corruption 0.07*** 0.03 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.10** 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.11*** 0.16*** 
 (0.024) (0.033) (0.053) (0.061) (0.038) (0.047) (0.038) (0.047) (0.048) (0.061) (0.036) (0.047) (0.038) (0.047) 
Courts 0.04 0.00 0.44*** 0.19** 0.30*** 0.21*** 0.34*** 0.29*** 0.40*** 0.19** 0.31*** 0.21*** 0.36*** 0.29*** 
 (0.037) (0.050) (0.090) (0.087) (0.070) (0.060) (0.063) (0.068) (0.087) (0.087) (0.071) (0.060) (0.065) (0.068) 
Cost of Labour (log) 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01 0.02** 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.02*** 0.01 0.02** -0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.02*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
Doing Business rank 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00**       
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)       
Tax rank         0.00*** 0.00     
         (0.000) (0.001)     
Permits rank           -0.00 0.00**   
           (0.000) (0.001)   
Trade rank             0.00*** 0.00** 
             (0.000) (0.000) 
Country dummies NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 413 413 413 413 413 413 413 413 413 413 413 413 413 413 
R-squared 0.198 0.605 0.341 0.769 0.307 0.717 0.397 0.689 0.375 0.769 0.305 0.717 0.375 0.689 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Sample splits by Doing Business Rank and Rule of Law 
 Doing Business bottom 50% (1-4) Rule of law bottom 50% (5-8) Doing Business bottom 25% (9-12) Rule of law bottom 25% (13-16) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 Time Tax Permits Trade Time Tax Permits Trade Time Tax Permits Trade Time Tax Permits Trade 
Corruption 0.02 0.39*** 0.25*** 0.12** 0.07 0.16 0.17** 0.12 0.04 0.36*** 0.40*** 0.03 -0.00 0.16 0.28*** 0.17 
 (0.067) (0.073) (0.068) (0.052) (0.070) (0.100) (0.076) (0.088) (0.065) (0.109) (0.103) (0.060) (0.050) (0.115) (0.102) (0.136) 
Courts -0.07 0.04 0.11 0.22*** -0.11 0.19 0.15 0.40*** -0.05 0.15 0.15* 0.30*** 0.08 0.08 0.21 0.18 
 (0.074) (0.078) (0.088) (0.069) (0.098) (0.169) (0.114) (0.145) (0.058) (0.113) (0.083) (0.088) (0.061) (0.193) (0.148) (0.198) 
Cost of Labour (log) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01* 0.02** 0.02** 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) 
Constant -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.08 -0.26 -0.03 -0.10 0.18 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 
 (0.087) (0.115) (0.084) (0.081) (0.092) (0.167) (0.125) (0.167) (0.151) (0.148) (0.123) (0.114) (0.079) (0.186) (0.165) (0.161) 
                 
Observations 212 212 212 212 160 160 160 160 104 104 104 104 76 76 76 76 
R-squared 0.537 0.740 0.690 0.579 0.642 0.757 0.714 0.684 0.512 0.709 0.644 0.499 0.751 0.762 0.704 0.655 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5. CONCLUSION 
We have presented evidence that regulation is likely to be a greater burden in more corrupt places. 
In these places, business managers tend to report spending more time dealing with regulation and 
that a wide range of regulatory issues are greater obstacles to their operations. These findings are 
robust to additional exogenous controls and alternative measures of the main variables. We 
extended our analysis to consider whether these associations hold at the subnational level, and 
when controlling for de jure regulation, and in sub-samples characterized by weak regulations and 
low-quality institutions. Again, we find that corruption is associated with more burdensome 
regulation in almost all specifications. In summary, it seems that corruption does not ease the 
burden of regulation but probably makes it worse by imposing additional costs on businesses.  
Our findings lend support to previous work which argues that misgovernance is partly responsible 
for low-quality regulation (Djankov, 2002; Guriev 2004; Breen and Gillanders, 2012), as well as 
a large body of research which finds that corruption has a negative impact on many social and 
economic outcomes (Gupta, 2002). Our findings suggest that policymakers should implement 
institutional and policy reforms to address the quality of regulation. However, institutional reforms 
by themselves may not be enough to improve the business environment if corrupt officials find 
ways to work around them. Strategies to control corruption, in addition to top-down institutional 
reforms, are a path to an improved business environment. Such reforms include monetary 
incentives, information and transparency measures, and investment in technologies that increase 
the costs of corruption. For example, an experiment in disseminating information regarding school 
capitation grants in Uganda was successful in reducing the amount of public funds wasted through 
corruption (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005). Such experiments could be developed specifically for 
the business environment. 
23 
 
Finally, our results have implications for the hypothesis that corruption greases the wheels of an 
economy that suffers from poor institutions. While our results are not enough evidence to reject 
outright the hypothesis, they do lead us to question elements of that argument that link corruption 
to less burdensome regulation and thus greater productivity and growth. If corruption positively 
affects growth under weak governance, we suggest that it must do so through other channels than 
lifting the average regulatory burden on firms. 
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1 This literature has been debated in economics since Leff (1964). Early contributions include the 
political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, who said that ‘in terms of economic growth, the only 
thing worse than a society with a rigid, overcentralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid 
overcentralized, and honest bureaucracy’ (1968, p. 386). However, the debate has deeper roots in 
history. The earliest discussion that we can find which uses the grease/sand terminology is Henry 
St. John Bolingbroke’s (1754) Dissertation upon Parties. In this text, Bolingbroke asserts that 
‘corruption serves to oil the wheels of government, and to render the administration more smooth 
and easy.’ 
2 There is a large literature on the effects and effectiveness of regulations covering a number of 
topics, including economic development (Gillanders and Whelan 2014), macroeconomic 
performance (Loayza et al. 2005), increased productivity and output (Aghion et al. 2009), and 
entrepreneurism (Klapper et al. 2006). 
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3 In addition to these studies, some studies find that corruption attracts FDI (Egger and Winner, 
2005), leads to the development of efficiency-enhancing black markets in centrally planned 
economies (Levy,  2007), and increases in output and productivity growth (Vial and Hanoteau, 
2010). 
4 These are just a selection from a wide literature focused primarily on economic outcomes. See 
Campos et al. (2010), for a meta-analysis of 41 empirical studies on corruption and growth. It finds 
that the vast majority of studies either find against the hypothesis that corruption is good for the 
economy, or are inconclusive. 
5 The survey clarifies: ‘By senior management I mean managers, directors, and officers above 
direct supervisors of production/sales workers. Some examples of government regulations are 
taxes, customs, labor regulations, licensing and registration, including dealings with officials and 
completing forms.’ 
6 We exclude the extent to which labour regulations are viewed as a constraint because labour 
regulations capture how workers are treated by their employers, as well as red tape. 
7 In further tests we interacted the level of corruption with the Doing Business rank and the Rule 
of Law, as the latter two variables may moderate the effect of corruption. The results are not 
presented here but are available on request. They are largely in agreement with our findings from 
Table 5. 
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Table A1. Data 
 N Mean Min. Max. Std. D. 
Country-level data     
Time 223 8.39 0.10 33.60 6.38 
Tax 225 24.41 0.40 76.70 14.30 
Permits 225 14.99 0.10 48.50 9.31 
Trade 224 16.83 0.00 58.40 10.56 
Corruption 224 33.65 0.00 83.70 19.69 
Rule of Law 220 -0.32 -1.95 1.65 0.74 
GPD per capita (log) 222 7.39 4.55 10.30 1.22 
Area (log) 220 11.80 5.56 16.61 2.00 
Control of Corruption 220 -0.31 -1.62 1.86 0.71 
      
Subnational-level data     
Time  434 0.12 0.00 0.48 0.08 
Permits 434 0.17 0.00 0.72 0.12 
Trade 434 0.15 0.00 0.77 0.13 
Corruption 434 0.38 0.00 0.92 0.22 
Courts 423 0.19 0.00 0.80 0.15 
Cost of Labour (log) 434 12.60 8.37 17.01 1.59 
      
 
 
